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Jurisdiction Over Absent Defendants:




THE AMERICAN VERSION OF THE FORUM ARRESTI
1. By the rule generally obtaining and internationally recog-
nized the courts of a given country are entitled, under proper
procedure, to adjudicate controversies as to immovables lying
within its boundaries in respect of a defendant residing abroad
or otherwise not found within these boundaries (forum rei
sitae). But in certain countries the possession by an absent de-
fendant of either movables or immovables within the territory
enables the courts to exercise jurisdiction in respect of such
absent defendant, even in the case, at least, of an action upon a
mere money demand. Thus in Germany' and Austria 2 it is pro-
vided in almost identical terms that in the case of claims for
money or money's worth (vermcegensrechtliche Anspriiche)
that court is competent within whose district there is found
property of the defendant. So in Denmark8 and Norway,4 with
* This article originally was written for the Revtsta de Derecho Procesal
of Buenos Aires, as a contribution to the memorial studies published by that
journal in 1951, in honor of the late Professor James Goldschmidt. It there
appeared (Afio IX, nos. 3-4, being vol. II of these studies, pp. 135-157) in
Spanish translation (by Dr. Catalina Grossmann) under the title of "Dos
aspectos de la jurisdicci6n sobre demandados ausentes, segfin el r~gimen
legal de Estados Unidos de Norteamerica." The fact that it was intended
for a Latin-American audience explains its point of view, as also the inclu-
sion, particularly in Part I, of much that will be familiar learning to the
present reader. The English version is here published by permission of
Dr. Santiago Sentis Melendo, Editorial Secretary of the Revista, acting for
its Director, Professor Hugo Alsina; in printing it occasion has been taken
to effect some minor emendations.
t Emeritus Professor of Law in Northwestern University.
1. Zivilprozessordnung, § 23.
2. Jurisdiktionsnorm, § 99.
3. Lov om Rettenspleje, § 248; 1 Munch-Petersen, Den danske Retspleje,
54, 2 id. at 33-34 (1923).




respect to demands for money or money's worth,5 it is declared
that the non-resident defendant may be sued in the judicial dis-
trict "where he has property." Similarly, in Sweden, the rule is
that "in actions touching the duty of payment, one who has no
known residence within the kingdom may be sued wherever
property belonging to him is found."6 Another instance of the
kind takes us to the Canadian province of Quebec, where the
Code of Civil Procedure provides that, apart from the case of a
cause of action arising in the province, in which case jurisdiction
exists on another ground, "the defendant may be summoned
before the court of the place where the whole or a part of his
property is situated, where he last left his domicile in the prov-
ince, or has never had such domicile, but has property there-
in ....
2. In Scotland the same rule obtains for the case of money
demands and other personal actions, without qualification as to
immovables, but where the property within the country consists
of movables the jurisdiction here in question is based upon its
arrest (Scottice "arrestment") by which it is subjected to the
control of the court. This form of arrest is known as arrestment
ad fundandam jurisdictionem or jurisdictionis fundandae causa,
and is effective only for this purpose. It has therefore no opera-
tion in securitatem debiti: if the plaintiff seeks to hold the ar-
rested property as a means of securing the expected judgment,
the jurisdictional arrest must be followed by a further arrest
directed to this end, the so-called "arrestment on the depen-
dence."" The Scottish founding of jurisdiction so accomplished was
borrowed of old from the contemporary law of Holland. There it
had been introduced at an early day "for safety and for the
favoring of commerce."9 And much the same manner of pro-
ceeding obtains in the Union of South Africa,10 which recognizes
the Roman-Dutch law as the basis of its legal system. This arrest
of property for the purpose of founding jurisdiction, unknown to
5. The Norwegian law speaks here of "formueskrav"; the Danish of
"Sager angaaende Formueretsforhold."
6. Rdtteghngsbalk 1948, kap. 10, § 1; Hassler, Den nya RWttegAngsbalken,
135 (1947); 1 Ekelbf, Kompendium over civilprocessen, 129 (1948). See also
Wrede, Das Zivilprozessrecht Schwedens und Finnlands, 75 (1924).
7. Code of Civil Procedure, Art. 94 (4) (ed. Gregg, 1935).
8. Mackay, Manual of Practice in the Court of Session, 59-61 (1893);
Maclaren, Court of Session Practice, 42 et seq. (1916); Balfour, Handbook of
Court of Session Practice, 13-14 (1922); Thomson and Middleton, Manual of
Court of Session Procedure, 35-39 (1937).
9. 1 Van der Linden, Verhandling over de Judiceele Practijcq, 269 (1794).
10. 4 Nathan, Common Law of South Africa, nos. 2030, 2274, 2285, 2286,
2293 (1907).
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the Roman law, is manifestly of Germanic derivation. As would
appear, it was out of an original practice of arrest that there
developed the rule which treats the mere presence of property
as a sufficient ground of jurisdiction." Indeed, the modern Swed-
ish law bears the imprint of this origin, inasmuch as the special
forum constituted by the presence of the defendant's property
is still spoken of as the forum arresti.2
3. Whenever jurisdiction over the absent defendant thus
exists, be it autonomous or, as in the two instances cited, founded
by the arrest of his property, it is a jurisdiction in which "the per-
son is subjected to the judicial power, not through his presence,
but through the presence of his property within the judicial dis-
trict.' 3 The property, indeed, may be the very object of the action,
but whether it is or not is of no moment so far as regards the
constitution of this forum.' 4 It follows that the jurisdiction thus
achieved is a jurisdiction which clothes the court with the same
power over the defendant's property rights as if he had been
normally found and cited within the judicial ambit. Accordingly,
if the plaintiff, prevails, the court is entitled to render against
the absent defendant what in the Anglo-American law is known
as a personal judgment-a judgment, that is to say, not restricted
in its operation to the property which gave rise to the jurisdic-
tion, but one which may be enforced against any or all of the
defendant's estate.15 We stress this point because of the different
principle that obtains in the United States.
4. Under the modern English law jurisdiction over defen-
dants who cannot be summoned in England exists only in the
situations specified in the Rules of the Supreme Court.' 6 So far
as regards actions involving a purely money demand, these situa-
11. See Wach, Handbuch des deutschen Civilprozessrechts, 418 note 9
(1885); 1 Hellwig, System des deutschen Zivilprozessrechts, 118 (1912); 2
Munch-Petersen, op. cit. supra note 3, at 34; 1 Ekelbf, op. cit. supra note 6,
at 129.
12. Ekelbf, op. cit. supra note 6, at 129; Hassler, op. cit. supra note 6,
at 135.
13. Wach, op. cit. supra note 11, at 418.
14. Ibid.; Schmidt, Lehrbuch des deutschen Zivilprozessrechts, 259 (2d
ed. 1906).
15. For Scotland, see Lindsay v. London & North-Western Railway Co.,
22 D. 571 (1860); North v. Stewart, 17 R. (H. L.) 60 (1890). In the latter
case it was said by Lord Watson that the sole purpose and effect of the
arrestment jurisdictionis fundandae causa in modern practice "is to fix the
locality of the subjects arrested in Scotland, and thereby to render their
foreign owner liable to be convened in a process issuing from the Court of
Session at the instance of the arrester for recovery of a personal debt."
(Id. at 63.)
16. Rules of the Supreme Court, 0. XI, r. 1.
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tions include inter alia certain cases of the forum contractus, as
well as the case of a tort committed in England (forum delicti
c6mmissi). But there is nothing corresponding to the rule above
mentioned. The mere presence in England of property belong-
ing to the absent defendant is never of itself a ground of juris-
diction in an action unconnected with that property. Nor is there
provided any measure corresponding to the Scottish arrestment
ad fundandam jurisdictionem, whereby the presence of such
property may be utilized to found jurisdiction. 17
5. In the United States the case is distinctly otherwise. For
its better understanding three considerations should be premised:
First. The question of jurisdiction over persons who are not
residents of the state or found therein is one that assumes its
chief importance because of the political relation of the states to
each other, since it arises for the most part as an interstate mat-
ter. Obviously each of the states is subject to the Federal Con-
stitution. "But, except as restrained and limited by that instru-
ment, they possess and exercise the authority of independent
States .. ."18 The existence of the several states, each with its
own judicial sovereignty, so far as consistent with the Federal
Constitution, thus renders them essentially foreign to each other
in point of the matters here under attention.
Second. In all the states there obtains the measure, variously
regulated, known as attachment on mesne process, which, cor-
responding to the arrest of certain other systems, and resembling
the embargo preventivo of the Spanish-American procedures,
enables the plaintiff to cause property of the defendant found in
the judicial district to be subjected to the interim control of the
court, either by actual seizure or otherwise, as a means of secur-
ing the ultimate satisfaction of the money judgment sought by
the plaintiff. In a small minority of the states, namely, those of
New England, no special grounds for the application of this
measure need in general be shown, but where such special
grounds are required, as they are elsewhere, the fact of the
defendant's non-residence is invariably one of them.
Third. So far as authorized by statute, a non-resident of
the state, mad6 defendant in a judicial proceeding, may be sum-
moned within the state by service upon his agent, expressly or
impliedly appointed by him to receive service of process on his
17. Wolff, Private International Law, 69-72 (1945).
18. Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 722 (1878).
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behalf. Such service is tantamount to service upon the defendant
himself within the jurisdiction, affording the basis for a personal
judgment, and falls outside the present discussion. But in other
cases where the state permits a non-resident to be summoned as
a defendant in a judicial proceeding, this is usually done by
what corresponds to the edictal citation of the civil law countries.
It commonly takes the form of publication of notice in a news-
paper at successive periods for a stated time, usually accompa-
nied by the sending of notice to the defendant through the post-
office, if his address is known. In some quarters, however, it may
consist only of the posting of notice in a designated public place.
In any case the giving of notice in this manner is spoken of as
"constructive service of process," although sometimes it is termed
"substituted" rather than "constructive" service. Actual service of
the summons upon the non-resident in the state of his residence
is generally treated as equivalent to constructive service, but has
no other or greater jurisdictional effect than constructive service.
6. "At one time the opinion extensively prevailed that judg-
ments in personam entered after constructive service upon a non-
resident, while they were not enforceable beyond the limits of
the state where entered, were nevertheless so far valid in that
state as to support a sale of the debtor's property situate
therein."'19 It had been made clear by certain decisions of the
Federal Supreme Court, arising under that clause of the Consti-
tution (Article IV, Section I) which requires the states to give
"full faith and credit" to the judicial proceedings of each other,
that judgments so rendered were entitled to no recognition
outside the state of rendition.20 The question, however, as to
the validity of these judgments within the state itself was
necessarily left to be determined by the law of the state. But
in 1868 was adopted the Fourteenth Amendment to the Federal
Constitution which inter alia forbade any state to "deprive
any person of life, liberty or property without due process
of law." There thus opened a new avenue for scrutiny by
the Supreme Court of judgments of the kind, and one which
would enable the court to pass upon their intraterritorial valid-
ity. Accordingly, under this provision there arose the question
19. Freeman, Law of Judgments, § 1373 (5th ed. 1925). Cases adopting
this view: Cyrus W. Field & Co. v. New Orleans Delta Newspaper Co., 19
La. Ann. 36 (1867); O'Hara v. Booth, 29 La. Ann. 817 (1877); Jarvis v. Bar-
rett, 14 Wis. 591 (1861); Wilson v. Zeigler, 44 Tex. 657 (1876) and other Texas
cases cited in Townes, Pleading in the District and County Courts of Texas,
43 (2d ed. 1913).
20. Particularly D'Arcy v. Ketchum, 11 How. 165 (U.S. 1850).
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as to what constituted due process of law in respect of a
judgment against a non-resident owning property within the
state. This question was dealt with and definitely determined in
the now celebrated case of Pennoyer v. Neff, decided in 1878.21
There it had been provided by the code of the State of Oregon
that, if a defendant could not be found within the state, the court
on a proper showing might grant an order authorizing service
by publication in the manner particularly designated, "when
the defendant is not a resident of the state, but has property
therein, and the court has jurisdiction of the subject of the ac-
tion." One Mitchell brought suit in the Circuit Court of Mult-
nomah County, Oregon, against Neff on a claim for attorney's
fees. Neff was not a resident of Oregon, but owned a tract of
land in the county named. Mitchell therefore obtained an order
of court for publication under the code provision, and notice to
Neff was published accordingly. This was the only service had
on Neff. The latter did not appear, and judgment was rendered
against him by default for the amount due Mitchell. Under an
execution issued upon this judgment Neff's tract of land was
levied upon and sold, and a sheriff's deed made to Pennoyer,
the purchaser at the sale. Neff now brought an action against
Pennoyer, in the Federal Circuit Court for the District of Oregon
to recover the land, asserting that Mitchell's judgment was void
for want of jurisdiction and that in consequence the sheriff's
deed passed no title to Pennoyer. The last mentioned court gave
judgment in favor of Neff, it based this, however, not upon a
fundamental lack of jurisdiction, but upon the ground that juris-
diction failed because, in the matter of publication, the Oregon
provision had not been properly complied with.22 The proceed-
ing was one, by way of writ of error, in review of the judgment
rendered by the Federal Circuit Court. There was thus presented
the question whether the Oregon court in rendering the original
judgment against Neff had been proceeding in accordance with
due process of law. The court considered that the lower court
was wrong in its view of the publication proceedings, but passed
to the broader ground contended for that under the circum-
stances the judgment was void for want of personal service, in
the absence of any interim subjection of the property to judicial
control, and on this ground held against the Mitchell judgment.
21. 95 U.S. 714 (1878).
22. Neff v. Pennoyer, 3 Sawy. 274, 17 Fed. Cas. No. 10,083 (1875).
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In the course of its opinion, the court reached the following con-
clusions:
(a) Constructive service upon a non-resident defendant is
ineffectual to support a personal judgment, a judgment, that is
to say, determining the personal rights and obligations of the
defendant.
(b) The bare fact that a non-resident defendant owns prop-
erty within the state does not alter the case: of itself it does not
warrant the exercise of jurisdiction over him to render a per-
sonal judgment based on constructive service.
(c) In the case of a mere money demand, no jurisdiction
whatever over the non-resident defendant arises by virtue of con-
structive service, unless his property found in the state shall
have been brought within the control of the court by attachment
or equivalent process.
(d) Any judgment rendered against the non-resident and
constructively served defendant, as a result of the jurisdiction
so founded, is confined in its operation to the very property
which has been attached or, by equivalent means, subjected to
the control of the court.
(e) In thus affecting the property so brought under judicial
control, the judgment is not a personal judgment, but partakes
of the nature of a judgment in rem.
By the court below, although, as appears, without bearing
on its judgment, the view had been expressed that so long as
the non-resident owned property in the state which could be
made to answer for the plaintiff's claim, it was immaterial
whether this was subjected to judicial control at the outset of
the action or was later taken on execution. This, however, was
met on the part of the Supreme Court by the consideration that
as to the non-resident "the jurisdiction of the court to inquire
into and determine his obligations at all is only incidental to
its jurisdiction over the property. Its jurisdiction in that respect
cannot be made to depend upon facts to be determined after it
has tried the cause and rendered the judgment. If the judgment
be previously void, it will not become valid by the subsequent
discovery of property of the defendant, or by his subsequent
acquisition of it. The judgment, if void when rendered, will
always remain void; it cannot occupy the doubtful position of
being valid if property be found, and void if there be none. Even
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if the position assumed were confined to cases where the non-
resident defendant possessed property in the state at the com-
mencement of the action, it would still make the validity of the
proceedings and judgment depend upon the question whether,
before the levy of the execution, the defendant had or had not
disposed of the property. If before the levy the property should
be sold, then according to this position, the judgment would not
be binding. This doctrine would introduce a new element of
uncertainty in judicial proceedings. The contrary is the law: the
validity of every judgment depends upon the jurisdiction of the
court before it is rendered, not upon what may occur subse-
quently. '28
In thus settling what had been a vexed question of jurisdic-
tion, the decision established a uniform jurisdictional rule for the
case of personal actions brought against non-residents-a rule
which, binding upon all the states alike, is now one of the bases
of American civil procedure.
7. In speaking of the judgment in its relation to the at-
tached property as in the nature of a judgment in rem, the court
placed it on the same basis as the judgment in a case where the
property is the direct object of an action inter partes. The forum
in that case, pursuant to general principles, is that of the situs of
the property in controversy, while here it is that of the property
attached. Both partake of the nature of a judgment in rem, since
it is, although in different ways, the res that is the operative
factor in both kinds of actions. In this regard it was said by the
Supreme Court in a later case that there is "a large class of cases
which are not strictly actions in rem, but are frequently spoken
of as actions quasi in rem, because, though brought against per-
sons, they only seek to subject certain property of those persons
to the discharge of the claims asserted. Such are actions in which
the property of non-residents is attached and held for the dis-
charge of debts due by them to citizens of the State, and actions
for the enforcement of mortgages, and other liens. Indeed, all
proceedings having for their sole object the sale or other dispo-
sition of the property of the defendant to satisfy the demands
of the plaintiff, are in a general way thus designated. But they
differ, among other things, from actions which are strictly in
rem, in that the interest of the defendant is alone sought to be
affected, that citation to him is required, and that judgment
23. 95 U.S. 714, 728 (1878).
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therein is only conclusive between the parties. '24 And, it may be
added, not only in the case of attachment but in all cases of this
character, jurisdiction may be obtained over a non-resident by
constructive service of process or by personal service outside the
state, jurisdiction, that is to say, which does not impose any per-
sonal liability upon him.2 15
8. So far as concerns the jurisdiction founded by the at-
tachment, while the term forum arresti is not known to the
American law, its substance plainly is present. What we have is
in reality a species of the forum arresti, where the existence
within the judicial ambit of the property placed under judicial
control by attachment or equivalent procedure enables the court
to deal with the action on the basis of constructive service, but
only to the extent of subjecting the property to the ensuing judg-
ment. Usually for this purpose there is issued a special writ of
execution applicable only to that property. The judgment actu-
ally entered may or may not be in a corresponding form; it
may be and often is in the ordinary form of a personal judg-
ment; but in any case it has no effect beyond the property
brought under judicial control by the means before indicated.
II.
A LEGACY OF THE PARTIDAS
9. Our system is not without exhibiting certain special con-
sideration for the non-resident or other defendant over whom
jurisdiction has been obtained by constructive service and who
fails to appear in the action. For one thing, it is commonly the
case that where the absent defendant thus suffers judgment by
default, a substantial period is allowed him within which he may
later appear, petition to be heard, and present his defense, if
any he has. Each state follows its own ideas as to the length
of this period. At one extreme is New York, where the period is
fixed at seven years from the date of the judgment or one year
from the time when the defendant was personally served with
written notice of the judgment; at the other, perhaps, is Utah,
which allows for this purpose only three months from the date
of the judgment. Then, again, in certain states, it is required
24. Freeman v. Alderson, 119 U.S. 185, 187 (1886).
25. It is to be noted that under the decision of the Supreme Court in
Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457 (1940), an absent defendant who is domiciled
in the state, even though not technically a resident, stands on a parity with
the resident as regards the acquisition of personal jurisdiction over him.
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that plaintiff, before the default judgment is entered, or at least
before it is executed, give bond for the protection of the defen-
dant in the event of the judgment being set aside. But, in gene-
ral, provisions of this kind mark the extent to which particular
consideration for the absent defendant has gone. It never has
been native to Anglo-American ideas to make provision for his
representation in the action. It is part of the tradition to provide
for the appointment of a guardian ad litem for the defendant who
is a minor or otherwise lacking in competency, but the tradition
does not extend any similar protection to the absent defendant
who is sui juris. In particular the benign principle obtaining in
the Latin-American countries, under which a curator for the
purpose of defense is either specially appointed for the absentee
or takes over that function in virtue of his public office, as in
the case of the Argentine defensor de pobres y ausentes, has had
no roots in the Anglo-American procedure. Yet the United States
is not wholly without the benefit of that principle. For there are
four states of the Union where, owing directly or indirectly to
the Spanish law and, in especial, to the Partidas, the statutes
give place to the special appointment of a representative of the
kind for the absent defendant.
10. First to be mentioned is Louisiana. Colonized by France
and thus governed by French law, Louisiana passed under
dominion of the Spanish law upon its cession to Spain in 1762.
Although retroceded to France in 1800, its sale by the latter to
the United States followed too closely for any official restora-
tion of the French law. Accordingly, when possession was taken
by the United States in 1803, while there was an undoubted
tendency on the part of the inhabitants to cling to French law,
the Spanish law was the rule of authority and so remained until
legislatively displaced. For a time, therefore, it continued to be
a subsidiary source of law under the American r6gime. Whether
and to what extent it survived the codifications of 1825 is some-
thing upon which there existed difference of opinion, but its
authority was definitely brought to an end by a statute of 1828.
In any event, the formative legislation of Louisiana, influenced
by both the French and the Spanish systems, took from the lat-
ter in reliance upon Partida 3, Titulo 2, Ley 12,26 the idea of ap-
26. "Vegadas y ha, que catiuan, o non son en la tierra, aquellos contra
quien el demandador quiere fazer su demanda, o mueren sin herederos, por
que han de fincar sus bienes desmanparados. E porende, el que quisiere
lazer tal demanda como esta, deue pedir al Juez del logar, que de quien
guarde, en aquel pleyto, los bienes do aquel a quien quiere demandar, e el
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pointing a special curator to represent the absent defendant.
Thus the first Civil Code, that of 1808, made it the duty of the
judge, in the case of an absent person interested in any suit, who
had no estate in the territory susceptible of being administered
by a curator, to "appoint a proper person to defend the rights of
the absentee, if he be not otherwise represented within this ter-
ritory, and if he has not himself appointed an attorney. '27 And
its successor, the Civil Code of 1825, provided that "if a suit be
instituted against an absentee who has no known agent in the
State, or for the administration of whose property no curator has
been appointed, the judge before whom the cause is pending
shall appoint a curator ad hoc to defend the absentee in the
suit. '28 So, also, the Code of Practice of 1825, after providing that
if a minor "against whom one intends to institute a suit has no
tutor nor a curator ad lites, the plaintiff must demand that a
curator ad hoc be named to defend the suit," declared that "the
same course must be pursued if the person intended to be sued
be absent and not represented in the state. '29 And this provision
was reinforced by others specifically directing such appointment
in certain particular classes of cases.30
As revised in 1870, the Civil Code of 1825 and the Code of
Practice of the same year remain in force, with various amend-
ments and as supplemented by special statutes. It has long been
the rule that the appointment of the curator may be made by
the clerk of the court.8 1 So, also, provision is now made for the
allowance of a fee to the curator ad hoc in attachment proceed-
ings, to be taxed as costs. 3 2 While the statute is still silent as to
other cases, the general practice has sanctioned the taxation as
deuelo fazer.... E quando tal Guardador fuere dado, puede entrar en juyzio
con el, e todo quanto razonare, o fiziere por el derechamente, e sin engafto,
sera valedero, tan bien como si estouiesse delante aquel cuyos fuessen los
bienes. Ca de otra guisa non valdria Za demanda, que fiziesse."
Under date of 1820 and pursuant to authority of the state legislature,
there was published an English translation, made by L. Moreau Lislet and
Henry Carleton, of such portions of the Partidas as were considered still in
effect. This included a translation of the foregoing provision. For an account
of the work in question, see Tucker, Source Books of Louisiana Law, 8
Tulane L. Rev. 401-403 (1934) and 1 Louisiana Legal Archives, LVI-LVIII
(1937).
27. A Digest of the Civil Law now in Force in the Territory of Orleans,
Book I, Tit. III, Art. 8 (1808).
28. Art. 57, La. Civil Code of 1825; Art. 56, La. Civil Code of 1870.
29. Art. 116, La. Code of Practice of 1825. See Arts. 116, 116.1, 973.67,
La. Code of Practice of 1870.
30. See Arts. 260, 294, 737, La. Code of Practice of 1870.
31. Art. 783.1, La. Code of Practice of 1870.
32. Art. 260.1, La. Code of Practice of 1870.
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
costs of such a fee as fixed by the court upon a hearing.38 But
nothing has occurred which in any way narrows the principle
of such an appointment as laid down in 1825.
In Louisiana, due largely to the presence of the curator ad
hoc, constructive service stands upon a distinctive basis. Where
the suit is one of attachment, this species of service is effected
by posting notice of the action in a public place, specifically by
affixing copies of the attachment writ and citation "on the door
of the room where the court in which suit is pending is held; or
on a bulletin board located near the entrance to said court
room. '' 34 But for other cases in which constructive service is ad-
missible, this /is constituted by serving copies of the petition
and citation upon the previously appointed curator ad hoc.3
With but slight exception, 8 the method more commonly ob-
taining in other states of publishing notice of the action by news-
paper advertisement finds here no recognition. The curator ad hoc
thus occupies an important place as a jurisdictional factor. But
the term curator ad hoc is in nowise sacramental; under a statute
of 1918 its use in the appointment of the representative is not
imperative so long as the appointment is of an attorney at law
to defend the absentee.8 7
11. The institution also exists in Kentucky. Here Spanish
rule never obtained, and in the absence of definite data we can
only conjecture that the presence of the institution is owed to
influence emanating from Louisiana. Before the days of railroads
the Ohio and Mississippi rivers formed the main artery of com-
munication with the territory towards the mouth of the Missis-
sippi; and between Kentucky, lying on the south bank of the
Ohio, and the important Louisiana seaport of New Orleans, there
was carried on an extensive commerce, followed by other forms
of intercourse. It would, therefore, have been entirely natural
for Kentucky lawyers, brought in contact with Louisiana pro-
cedural methods, to become impressed with the essential justice
33. Brown v. Furlong, 166 La. 537, 117 So. 583 (1928).
34. Art. 254, La. Code of Practice of 1870.
35. Art. 195, La. Code of Practice of 1870; Mason v. Benedict, 43 La. Ann.
397, 8 So. 930 (1891); Bartels v. Souchon, 48 La. Ann. 783, 19 So. 941 (1896).
36. See Arts. 292, 293, La. Code of Practice of 1870.
37. Art. 116.1, La. Code of Practice of 1870. Much the same result had
previously been reached by judicial decision. "The words 'attorney ad hoc/
'curator ad hoc,' and 'advocate,' when used with respect to an absent de-
fendant, indicate the person named and appointed by the Court to defend
him in the suit in which the appointment is made." Bienvenu v. Factors'
and Traders' Insurance Co., 33 La. Ann. 209, 255 (1881).
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of the institution in question, and so to have occasioned its recep-
tion in their own state. However this may be, it appears to have
been introduced by a statute of 183738 for the case of attach-
ment proceedings. But when Kentucky adopted a code of civil
procedure in 1851, to be completed in the version of 1854,39 this
made the principle applicable to civil actions in general.
Under the system of constructive service established by that
code, and basically still in force as governed by the present code,
adopted in 1876, there is entered upon proper affidavit of the fact
of non-residence or other ground of such service, what is known
as a "warning order," calling upon the absentee to defend the
action within the time appointed by law. There is no publication
of the order by newspaper advertisement, posting or otherwise,
bit the defendant is deemed constructively summoned on the
thirtieth day after the making of the'order.40
By the Code of 1851-54 it was provided as to the principle
in question that, in the case of a non-appearing defendant who has
been constructively summoned, "it shall be necessary . . . that
an attorney be appointed, at least sixty days before the judg-
ment is rendered, to defend for the defendant, and inform him
of the action, and of such other matters as may be useful to him
in preparing for his defense. The attorney may be appointed by
the clerk when the warning order is made, or by the court, and
shall receive a reasonable compensation for his services, to be
paid by the plaintiff and taxed in the costs."'4 1 It was further pro-
vided that "the attorney appointed . . . shall be a regular prac-
ticing attorney of the court; and before an order for his com-
pensation is made, he must make a written statement of all that
he has done in the case, which shall be signed by him, and filed
with the papers of the action.
'42
These provisions having been to some extent recast in the
present code, it is now required that the attorney to represent
the absentee shall be appointed at the time when the warning
order is made, it being correspondingly provided that the con-
structive service is deemed complete on the thirtieth day after
the making of the order and the appointment of the attorney.
38. Act of Feb. 2, 1837; Ky. Laws 103-106 (1836-37); Digest of Statute Law
of Kentucky 18 (Loughborough, 1842).
39. Code of Practice in Civil Cases 1854, amending like named code of
1851.
40. Code of 1876, §§ 57, 58, 60 (Carroll, 1948).
41. Ky. Code of Practice in Civil Cases 1851-1854, § 440.
42. Section 441.
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By the existing rule the appointment is to be made by the clerk
of the court, subject to the discretionary right of the court to
substitute an appointee of its own. Moreover, it is now declared
that the attorney so appointed (commonly called the "warning
order attorney") must "make diligent efforts to inform the de-
fendant by mail concerning the pendency and nature of the
action against him and must report to the court . . . the result
of his efforts." If unable thus to inform the defendant, or if he
learn that the defendant is under certain designated disability,
he must so report to the court, "and shall make an affirmative
defense if he can;" inability to make such defense must like-
wise be reported. 48
Under the earlier interpretation of the Kentucky Court of
Appeals, the failure thus to appoint an attorney or the failure of
the attorney to report to the court, while constituting error and
hence ground for setting aside the judgment on appeal, was not
jurisdictional.44 But more recently there appeared a conflict of
decision on the point. While the same view has received adher-
ence,45 it has also been distinctly held that the failure of the
warning order attorney to notify the defendant as required by
the code renders the judgment void.46
12. Arkansas, too, possesses the institution. Although its
lands were once under Spanish dominion, as part of the old
province of Louisiana, it is not this circumstance that accounts
for its acceptance of the principle. On the contrary, the explana-
tion simply is that it was borrowed out of hand from Kentucky.
For when, in 1868, Arkansas adopted a code of civil procedure,
47
it followed very closely that governing in Kentucky, 48 probably
because, among the American codes, it offered the pattern most
in accordance, on the whole, with the previous Arkansas devel-
opment. Hence it is that we find the provisions of the Kentucky
code of 1854, on the subject of the appointed attorney for the
constructively served absentee, reproduced almost verbatim. To
be noted, however, is the substitution of thirty days before judg-
ment for the sixty of the 1854 Kentucky provision, in designating
43. Code of 1876, § 59 (Carroll, 1948).
44. Brown v. Early, 2 Duv. (63 Ky.) 369 (1866); Thomas v. Iahone,
9 Bush (72 Ky.) 111 (1872).
45. First Owensboro Bank & Trust Co. v. Wells, 282 Ky. 88, 137 S.W. 2d
732 (1940).
46. Fugate v. Fugate, 259 Ky. 18, 81 S.W. 2d 889 (1935). See also Sachs v.
Title Ins. & Trust Co., 305 Ky. 154, 157, 202 S.W. 2d 384 (1947).
47. Ark. Code of Practice in Civil Actions, approved July 22, 1868.
48. Hepburn, Historical Development of Code Pleading, § 114 (1897).
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the time limited for his appointment, as also inclusion of a pro-
vision declaring that the appointed attorney "may take any step
in the progress of the cause except filing answer without it hav-
ing the effect of entering the appearance of such defendant. ' 49
More conservative than Kentucky has been, Arkansas exhibits
none of the changes made there, but adheres to these provisions
as adopted in 1868.
As may be gathered from what has been said, Arkansas fol-
lows the Kentucky practice of making a warning order against
the absent defendant. This warns him to "appear in the action"
within thirty days from the time of its making. But a very sig-
nificant departure from the Kentucky practice is present in the
requirement that the warning order be published weekly for at
least four weeks.5
In this state compliance with the provisions relating to the
attorney ad litem is considered essential to the validity of the
judgment against the non-appearing absentee. In 1927 it was
said by the Arkansas Supreme Court that "we are of the opinion
that until the thirty days have expired after the appointment of
the attorney ad litem, and he has made his report, the court is
without jurisdiction to take any affirmative action in the case. In
other words, that a compliance with these sections of the Digest
is mandatory and jurisdictional. Until they are substantially
complied with, the court is without jurisdiction to make any final
order affecting the rights of the non-resident defendant."'51
13. Lastly we come to Texas, where the institution is a
direct heritage from the Spanish-Mexican law. Prior to 1836,
Texas was Mexican territory, forming part of the state of Coa-
huila and Texas. In that year it succeeded in establishing its in-
dependence, and became the Republic of Texas; nine years later
it was admitted to the Union as the State of Texas. Cardinal for
our present inquiry is a decree of the Congress of Coahuila and
Texas under date of 1834 which, with reference to civil actions,
provided for citation by posting in a public place, if the defen-
dant could not be otherwise cited (Article 96), or, if he resided
in another jurisdiction, by application to the court of that juris-
diction (Article 97), and then enacted (Article 98) that "si no
49. Ark. Code of Practice in Civil Actions, §§ 445, 446 (1868); Ark. Stat.
Ann. 1947, §§ 29-404, 29-405.
50. Ark. Code of Practice in Civil Actions, §§ 79, 80, 82 (1868); Ark. Stat.
Ann. 1947, HI 27-354, 27-355, 27-357.
51. Frank v. Frank, 175 Ark. 285, 289, 298 S.W. 1026, 1027 (1927).
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se sabe donde estd el demandado, 6 exsiste fudra del Estado en
un lugar de donde se dificulte el que comparesca pronto, 6 siendo
citado en la forma prevenida por el articulo anterior, no contesta
en el termino que seiiale la citacion, 6 si en qualquier estado del
juicio, alguna de las partes no comparece cuando tiene obligacion
de hacerlo; con informacion del hecho, y d pedimento de la parte
interesada nombrard el juez d la ausente curador ad litem con
quien seguird el pleito come si fuera con la parte misma."52
This decree, along with other parts of the Spanish law, remained
in force until the general repeal of that law by the statute of
January 20, 1840. 53
After statehood, regulation of procedure to obtain jurisdic-
tion over absent defendants appears in statutes of 184654 and
1848.r5 The means adopted was that of newspaper publication.
In both of these acts, provision being made for thus citing un-
known persons as the heirs, successors or legal representatives
of any deceased person, it was further enacted that when such
notice was given and no appearance was entered, the court was
to appoint an attorney to defend on behalf of such unknown
heirs, successors or legal representatives. Further reference to
the attorney ad litem is found in an act of 1866, which amends
that last mentioned, and repeats the provision as to his appoint-
ment, adding provision for his compensation.56 But, whatever
may have been the case in the actual practice of the courts,
so far there had appeared no statute of the kind for the protec-
tion of the constructively served and non-appearing defendant,
applicable to civil causes in general. And this did not come until
the adoption of the Revised Civil Statutes of 1879. Here it was
provided that "where service of process has been made by publi-
cation, and no answer has been filed within the time prescribed
by law, the court shall appoint an attorney to defend the suit,
and judgment shall be rendered as in other cases, but in every
such case a statement of the evidence, approved and signed by
the judge, shall be filed with the papers of the case as part of
the record thereof.'57 Complemented by the clause (which ap-
parently dates from the Revised Civil Statutes of 1888)58 that
52. Decree No. 277, April 17, 1834: Leyes y decretos del estado de Coa-
huila y Texas 265 (1839).
53. Thouvenin v. Rodrigues, 24 Tex. 468 (1859).
54. Act of May 13, 1846, Texas Laws 1846, 366-367.
55. Act of March 16, 1848, Texas Laws 1848, c. 95, §§ 13, 14.
56. Act of Nov. 9, 1866, Tex. Laws 1866, c. 124, § 14.
57. Tex. Rev. Clv. Stat. 1879, Art. 1345.
58. Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. 1888 (Sayles), Art. 1212.
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"the court shall allow such attorney a reasonable compensation
for his services, to be taxed as part of the costs of the suit," the
provision, substantially in this form, was included in the last
revision of the civil statutes, that of 1925.11 The regulation of civil
procedure having been committed to rules of court under an act
of 1939, the provision in question with but slight verbal change
passed into the Rules of Civil Procedure, as adopted in 1941.
Thus it is that Rule 244 now provides that "where service has
been made by publication, and no answer has been filed nor ap-
pearance entered within the prescribed time, the court shall
appoint an attorney to defend the suit on behalf of the defen-
dant, and judgment shall be rendered as in other cases, but in
every such case a statement of evidence, approved and signed
by the judge, shall be filed with the papers as part of the record
thereof. The court shall allow such attorney a reasonable fee for
his services as part of the costs." And a further passage of the
Rules (Rule 759) which has its background in a statute of 1879,6°
makes specific provision for such an appointment for the defense
of defendants sued as unknown persons in actions for partition
of land.61
There seems little doubt that failure to comply with the
provision in reference to the appointment does not extend to
invalidate the judgment. In proper cases, however, it is regarded
as error sufficing to cause a reversal of the judgment.6 2 Failure
of the attorney to discharge his duty toward the absent defendant
may likewise bring about a reversal.63 In the latter regard, in-
terest attaches to the salutary observations of the Texas Court of
Civil Appeals as to the duty of the appointed attorney. "The
statute requiring the appointment of an attorney to represent
defendants cited by publication," said the court, "was enacted
for the benefit of such defendants, in order that their legal rights
might be protected against snap judgments, and that in the trial
of such cases they may have the benefit of every defense, objec-
tion, and exception which would be available to them if personally
present or if represented by counsel of their own selection. Such
purpose was undoubtedly in the mind of the Legislature in en-
acting the statute, and such is the spirit, if not the letter, of the
59. Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. (Vernon 1936), Art. 2158.
60. Act of March 24, 1879, Texas Laws 1879, c. 51.
61. Franki, Vernon's Texas Rules of Civil Procedure 262, 597 (1942).
62. Garvey v. State, 88 S.W. 873 (Tex. Civ. App. 1905).
63. Lopez v. Calzado, 281 S.W. 324 (Tex. Civ. App. 1926); Madero v.
Calzado, 281 S.W. 328 (Tex. Civ. App. 1926).
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act. The duty of an attorney appointed in such cases is not
merely perfunctory in its nature, notwithstanding the probable
fact that it has grown to be a custom to thus lightly treat that
office. For it is the duty of such attorney to defend the rights of
his involuntary client with the same vigor and astuteness he
would -employ in the defense of clients who had expressly em-
ployed him for such purpose. In suits of this character, nothing
can be admitted against the interest of the absent defendant,
and the one chosen to represent that interest in a case stands in
court to insist that no pleading shall go unchallenged, no step
shall be taken, no act done, no evidence produced, which shall
in any manner be legitimately the subject of an objection or ex-
ception. ' '64
14. By way of postscript to the foregoing we should notice
the fleeting existence of the institution in California under
American rule. Like Texas, California, as part of Mexico, had
been governed by Spanish law before it passed to the United
States. In 1851 enough of the Spanish influence had survived to
cause the Practice Act of that year to admit the principle under
discussion in a qualified way. The act provided for constructive
service by newspaper publication, but also declared that "in
actions upon contract for the direct payment of money the Court
in its discretion may, instead of ordering publication, or may
after publication, appoint an attorney to appear for the non-
resident, absent or concealed defendant, and conduct the pro-
ceedings on his behalf." '6 5 This provision was apparently carried
into the California Code. of Civil Procedure of 1872,66 but was
dropped by an amendatory act of 1874,67 and has never been
restored. In any case, apart from its possible application to
attachment proceedings, there would have been no room for its
operation after the decision in 1877 of the case of Pennoyer v.
Neff.
15. One cannot doubt that if a wider knowledge of the
institution had existed among American lawyers, it would have
appeared in other quarters. For it is manifest that the more
commonly employed method of service by newspaper publica-
tion is of slight use in bringing to the absent defendant notice
of the proceedings against him. More often than not the news-
64. Madero v. Calzado, 281 S.W. 328, 330 (Tex. Civ. App. 1926).
65. Calif. Practice Act of 1851, § 31.
66. Section 413.
67. Act of March 24, 1874: Acts Amendatory of the Codes 1873-1874, 299
(1874).
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paper selected is one that has little or no circulation outside the
borders of the state in which it is printed; very often, indeed, it
is a legal journal which seldom or never comes to the eyes of
lay readers. In many if not most of the states, the publication
is to be accompanied by notice sent through the post-office, but
this is possible only when the plaintiff knows the defendant's
address, and in general he is under no adequate compulsion to
obtain it; while the statute often presupposes "diligent inquiry,"
this is a condition for the most part easily satisfied. What more
logical, what more in keeping with practicality and procedural
fairness than to impose this duty of investigation and communi-
cation upon an agent appointed by the court and responsible to
it for the diligence and rectitude of his conduct, and one who in
any case is to see that the rights of the absent defendant are to
be protected so far as lies within his power? It is strange that,
even without knowledge of the Spanish principle, the idea had
not made itself generally felt as a means of achieving that equal-
ity of controversial opportunity which should be a cardinal tenet
of procedural polity. We can only hope that in the current era
of procedural reform in the United States, the present principle
will command such attention among those interested in improv-
ing the quality of civil justice as will extend its recognition and
give it the place it deserves as an appurtenance of our procedural
systems.
